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Abstract 
Rationality has long been one of the key principles of economics because it seeks to 
explain patterns of behavior and preferences in economic interactions. The belief that economic 
agents interact to maximize individual gain as a means of making themselves better off helps to 
explain the motivations underlying exchange as a fundamental concept of economics. Specific to 
game theory, theories of rationality predict that individuals are so-called “rational” agents who 
behave in such a way as to maximize individual gain in social dilemmas even at the expense of 
others. However, both laboratory experiments and everyday behavior challenge these existing 
theories by demonstrating that humans do in fact cooperate in competitive social situations at a 
cost to themselves. These findings call into question the theoretical framework of rationality 
foundational to game theory and suggest the presence of external factors that may influence our 
willingness to cooperate in competitive environments. 
The goal of this research is to analyze the impact of three of these potential factors—
intensity of competition, game duration, and group size—on cooperation through a series of 
bargaining game experiments. Analysis of earnings and claims across several iterations of a 
Traveler’s Dilemma bargaining game allowed for conclusions to be drawn about the relationship 
between these factors and cooperation. Our results show this relationship to be significant in the 
cases of game duration and group size, but insignificant for intensity of competition. Of notable 
importance is the clear impact of increasing group size in our experiments as a model of the 
Tragedy of the Commons theory of shared resources. Our results offer strong support for the 
Tragedy of the Commons in that they reflect a significant decrease in earnings and claims as 
group size increased. These results are consistent with the predictions of the Tragedy of the 
Commons in suggesting that cooperation for the sustenance of a common resource becomes 
increasingly difficult to maintain the more agents are simultaneously responsible for it. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The existence of cooperation in social dilemmas is an inherently puzzling aspect of 
human nature that has become a subject of recent interest to a wide range of disciplines—most 
notably including economics, biology, political science, and anthropology—that all offer unique 
means of identifying and analyzing preferences for cooperation. Theories of rationality in 
economics claim that individuals are rational agents who behave in such a way as to maximize 
individual gain even at the expense of others, while evolutionary biology has similar roots in the 
“survival of the fittest” belief of competition as the central determinant of individual and group 
fitness (Darwin, 1871). However, both laboratory experiments and everyday behavior challenge 
these existing theories by demonstrating that humans do in fact cooperate in competitive social 
situations, even at a cost to themselves. These findings call into question the theoretical 
framework of rationality underlying game theory and suggest the presence of external factors 
that may influence our willingness to cooperate in competitive environments. 
The goal of this research is to analyze the impact of three of these factors—intensity of 
competition, game duration, and group size—on cooperation through a series of Traveler’s 
Dilemma bargaining game experiments. Each experiment was used to model a social dilemma in 
which participants were presented with a fundamental choice between cooperation and defection. 
In the Traveler’s Dilemma, players are grouped together for a series of rounds in which they 
simultaneously claim a dollar amount from $0.80-$2.00. The player who declares the lower 
amount is rewarded, while the player who declares the higher amount is penalized. Players who 
declare the same amount receive no reward or penalty. The payoff structure is set such that a 
claim of $2.00 allows individuals to avoid penalty but exposes them to the possibility of being 
undercut by their partners. Cooperation is thus paradoxical in that it is simultaneously a means of 
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earning the highest average payoff per round, while also being a necessarily risky strategy due to 
the risk of defection. Such is the nature of the common resource social dilemma: the decision to 
cooperation contributes to the benefit of the entire group, but the choice to defect offers 
participants the opportunity to maximize individual benefit at the expense of the others. 
Game theory predicts deviation from the cooperative outcome to be the dominant 
strategy, yet collective action experiments consistently demonstrate that human beings are 
willing to forgo some level of payoff to cooperate in social dilemmas. Our experiments allowed 
us to observe the extent to which this holds true under a variety of conditions, with the goal of 
commenting on the factors that play a significant role in determining when we choose to defy 
theoretical predictions of rationality. For intensity of competition, we modeled how the 
frequency of cooperative behavior is impacted by an increasingly competitive environment 
through the elimination of low-earning players. We hypothesized that increasing the competitive 
nature of the game would cause players to cooperate more in order to avoid elimination. For 
game duration, we observed how participants behaved when matched for different amounts of 
time under the belief that longer interactions would yield greater cooperation. Finally, for group 
size we tested the frequency with which participants chose to cooperate in groups of different 
sizes. 
This final experiment was especially significant in that it was used to model the Tragedy 
of the Commons theory of shared resources presented by Garrett Hardin in 1968. Hardin’s essay 
discusses the difficulty in maintaining a common resource in the absence of coercive 
mechanisms under the assumption that individuals will choose behavior for the maximization of 
individual benefits at the expense of the common good. This theory has become especially 
relevant in recent history as a model for modern issues such as overfishing and climate change 
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that require collective action to avoid consequences of international magnitude. We found 
examining this theory to be especially notable considering its game-theoretical roots and modern 
implications for economic and political policy.  
Ultimately, we hope to identify potential motivations underlying cooperative behavior in 
order to provide a foundation on which greater insight into what drives cooperation can be 
utilized to generate cooperation in competitive environments. In order to do so we must first 
understand the role of cooperation throughout our species’ history, the mechanisms for its 
evolution, and why our behavior so consistently deviates from theoretical predictions. 
 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Rationality 
With a breadth of disciplines interested in understanding how competition and 
cooperation relate to the evolution of human nature—specifically economics, anthropology, 
evolutionary biology, and ecology—it is unsurprising that there is little consensus among 
scholars as to their importance and impact on patterns of human behavior. The theory that human 
nature is inherently competitive has been supported by the assumptions of rationality that have 
existed as the foundation of behavioral game theory since the discipline’s inception (von 
Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). These theories of rationality assume that humans act as selfish 
agents capable of identifying strategies to maximize individual payoff without regard for the 
outcomes of others or their failure to do “the right thing” (Dawes & Thaler, 1988). Under these 
predictions, human behavior is necessarily competitive and cooperation is dismissed as 
irrational, as any attempts at cooperative behavior are understood to be impracticable considering 
the assumed selfish behavior of other players in competitive social dilemmas. 
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However, much of the existing literature identifies the myriad shortcomings of these 
assumptions and the restrictions that they place on understandings within behavioral game 
theory. As Cosmides and Tooby (1994) explain, the tacit assumption of rationality assumes that 
so-called rational behavior is the state of nature, and thus explanations that invoke the cognitive 
processes underlying human choices are only required when behavior deviates from this assumed 
state. They instead argue that the true state of human nature is in fact not behaving at all, and as 
such all behaviors represent a departure from this state of inaction and consequently require 
explanation. Humans make decisions by virtue of neural computational devices, and thus 
explanation of any behavior—rational or not—is rooted in theories of the architecture of such 
devices.  
Cosmides and Tooby (1994) note that the problems that have shaped these devices were 
those characteristic of our ancestors’ hunter-gatherer past rather than those of the modern world. 
The authors argue that it can be demonstrated that “rational” decision-making methods are 
incapable of solving the natural adaptive problems our ancestors faced in order to reproduce, 
thus making them computationally very weak. This is the primary reason why mechanisms for 
specialized problem-solving were favored by natural selection over those for general-purpose 
problem-solving. The natural selection of specialized problem solving over our evolutionary 
history suggests that the human mind may not be irrational but may instead be better than 
rational, outperforming artificial problem-solving systems that are programmed to apply the 
same problem-solving methods to every problem and are unable to incorporate special 
assumptions into the process. Natural selection has equipped humans with cognitive 
specializations and problem-solving strategies that allow us to incorporate problem-specific 
regularities into the decision-making process (Cosmides & Tooby, 1994). Compared to 
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generalized problem-solving, specialized decision-making methods perform in a manner better 
than rational in that they can arrive at successful outcomes that general-purpose methods reach 
either less efficiently, or not at all. Such a conclusion suggests that the traditional and normative 
approaches to rationality are inherently flawed and may explain the inability of existing 
economic theory to accurately predict patterns of human behavior.  
Stanovich (2013) similarly claims that flaws within our traditional understandings of 
rationality are responsible for the perceived irrationality of human behavior, specifically when 
compared to that of animals. Stanovich argues that the view of human behavior as less rational 
than that of animals is unfair and a product of the shortcomings of the so-called “axioms of 
rational choice” that human behavior so often seems to violate. These axioms represent patterns 
of preferences that model behavior considered to be utility-maximizing, and while studies have 
shown that nonhuman animals are largely rational in the axiomatic sense, Stanovich argues that 
the principles of rational choice are easier to follow when the cognitive structure of the organism 
is simpler (Stanovich, 2013).  Human cognition is complicated by the role of contextual 
complexity, symbolic complexity, and higher-order evaluations of preferences, which Stanovich 
sees as three significant exclusions from basic assumptions of rationality responsible for the 
perception of human behavior as irrational. 
This perception is reinforced under the axiomatic approach by the incorporation of 
instrumental rationality, defined as adherence to consistent and coherent relationships 
(Stanovich, 2013). The use of instrumental rationality allows the rationality of animals to be 
compared to that of humans (Kacelnick, 2006), but this assessment fails to account for contextual 
information and symbolic utility that humans code into decisions and use to both layer and 
evaluate preferences. Unlike other animals, humans appear capable of structuring preferences 
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such that they can model a preference for a particular set of “first-order” preferences. In order to 
satisfy potentially conflicting preferences, humans attempt to integrate rationally across all 
vertical levels of preference, which can result in an instability of instrumental rationality that 
does not challenge nonhuman animals (Stanovich, 2013). As Stanovich argues, it is thus not 
paradoxical for humans to be understood as less axiomatically rational than animals considering 
the complexity of information that humans are able and often required to code into their 
decisions. 
 This idea that preferences should not be constrained by traditional understandings of 
rationality is similarly built upon by Sobel (2005). Sobel discusses the ways in which one can 
expand the notion of preferences and pays particular attention to the impact on decision-making 
of reciprocity, which he defines as “a tendency to respond to perceived kindness with kindness 
and perceived meanness with meanness and to expect this behavior from others.” Sobel uses a 
model of intrinsic reciprocity—which he claims to be a property of preferences—and is 
operating under the theory that (1) individual preferences depend on the consumption of others, 
and (2) that the rate at which one values the consumption of others is dependent on both past and 
anticipated actions.  
Sobel’s (2005) model builds on the more traditional view of instrumental reciprocity in 
which cooperation acts as a strategy for establishing a reputation as a reliable partner in order to 
maintain a profitable long-term relationship with others. The author’s theoretical model suggests 
that while defection may be a dominant short-term strategy, cooperation in repeated interactions 
can lead to long-term profitability when players have established a reputation of reliability 
(Sobel, 2005). Sobel argues that this approach is powerful considering nearly all natural 
exchanges can be viewed as part of a long-term interaction, thus providing constant incentive to 
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be perceived as reliable. Under this theory, the potential long-term gains from cooperative 
interaction facilitated by a reliable reputation outweigh the short-term opportunity for defection 
at the expense of harming one’s reputation and the possibility of cooperation in the future. 
The conclusion of reciprocity as an underlying motivator of so-called “irrational” 
behavior developed by Axelrod (1984) is one of the most consistent in the literature and is 
adopted by Dawes and Thaler (1988) as a factor of “reciprocal altruism.” Dawes and Thaler 
suggest that free riding, a form of defection in which an individual benefits from the contribution 
of others to a common resource but does not contribute themselves, may be a less fruitful 
strategy when factoring in the probable future response of others. When a social dilemma 
persists for numerous rounds, cooperators ultimately benefit considering that a cooperative act 
contributes to one’s reputation as a cooperative person and is reciprocated with cooperation a 
high percentage of the time. 
One apparent flaw of this theory is that while it may be considered rational to cooperate 
in repeated interactions, one-shot social dilemmas offer no opportunity for cooperative 
reciprocity and should result in low levels of cooperation. However, Isaac and Walker (1988) 
observe 50 percent cooperation rates even in single trial experiments, which suggests that 
reciprocity may be insufficient in challenging understandings of rationality. Dawes and Thaler 
(1988) argue that this insufficiency may be filled by altruism—some combination of “taking 
pleasure in others’ pleasure” and “doing the right thing.” In this context, the payoff of 
cooperation is complemented by the individual benefit derived from the altruistic act. This 
benefit is non-monetary and is thus excluded from a generalized calculation of rationality in 
which the payoff of defection is compared to the payoff of cooperation, yet it contributes to the 
idea that a strategy of defection may not be purely rational even when payoff-dominant. 
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 In Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (1944), the foundational text in game 
theory, authors John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern initiate a movement to conceptualize 
rationality as the maximization of expected utility by an individual. This laid the groundwork for 
the assumptions of rationality present in modern game theory, but Colman (2003) believes that 
the school of thought they established has created significant problems for both normative and 
positive interpretations of game theory. Rational assumptions of orthodox game theory are not 
characteristic of social interactions because they cannot guide players to focal points, equilibrium 
points in coordination dilemmas seen as “intuitive” choices by players that are payoff-indifferent 
under utility maximization (Colman, 2003). Colman offers the example of a Heads or Tails 
coordination game in which two players benefit from predicting the same result, resulting in a 
payoff matrix of two Nash Equilibria. Consequently, game theory predicts players will engage in 
mixed strategies, yet nearly 87% of individuals chose Heads. This suggests a tendency to see 
Heads as the better of two strategies and thus a focal point in mixed strategies, yet under the 
theory of utility maximization there is no incentive to pick one option over the other. Theoretical 
predictions are naturally handicapped due to their inability to incorporate external information 
into the payoff matrix, and as a result are unable to accurately predict patterns of human 
behavior. 
 The inability of rationality theory to guide players to focal points or explain why 
individuals choose them in practice is one of the major flaws challenging its accuracy and 
validity as a foundation of game theory. The shortcomings of rationality in social contexts is not 
merely a matter of accuracy in explaining individual behavior but also of restricting behavior by 
simplifying it to a series of rules frequently violated in social interaction. The assumptions that 
seek to predict the behavior of humans fail to account for the myriad constraints that humans 
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face in everyday decision-making and the heuristic rules necessitated by those constraints. 
Bounded rationality has long been concerned with the constraints we face when making 
decisions (most notably cognitive) and the home-grown rules of thumb that we use to make 
decisions in the face of these constraints (Simon, 1982). 
 Simon (1982) argues that theories of bounded rationality require a relaxation of one or 
more of the assumptions of expected utility theory. Rather than assume a fixed set of alternatives 
to choose from, bounded rationality postulates the generation of alternatives on the individual 
level, procedures for estimating unknown probability distributions of outcomes, and satisfying 
strategies for maximizing utility. These are drawn from evidence about human thought and 
choice processes, including our cognitive capacity for generating alternatives, computing their 
consequences under varying levels of certainty, and ultimately making comparisons among 
them. Theories of bounded rationality are theories of decision-making and assume that the 
decision-maker uses their mind as well as possible to attain goals, but that they face in the 
decision process the true capacities of the human mind overlooked by assumptions of rationality. 
 In response to Simon (1982), Selten (1990) accepts bounded rationality as a deviation 
from traditional rationality and utility maximization theory but cautions that modeling bounded 
rationality merely as optimization under constraints of memory size and computational capacities 
based on abstract principles rather than empirical evidence is doomed to fail. In addition to the 
use of empirical evidence, Selten argues that there exists a series of motivational limits on 
rationality that result from a view of decision emergence. Decisions are made on several levels 
within the brain, with the final decision guided by simple learnings processes. The decision 
alternatives that occur on levels throughout the brain do not necessarily produce a clear 
recommendation, however, resulting in certain motivational constraints. The decision emergence 
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view emphasizes that rationality’s view over behavior is limited and diminished further by the 
influences of emotion. Emotions narrow attention to a restricted selection of alternatives related 
to temporary goals and fears, and in doing so control the direction and thinking of imagination 
(Selten, 1990). This is counterbalanced to some extent by the conscious mind’s visualization of 
future consequences of actions which shifts the motivational system towards more long run 
goals, but it nevertheless inhibits the sort of rational processes that game theory is predicated on. 
 Cooperation has remained puzzling throughout human history due to the inability of 
theoretical predictions to accurately model human behavior. However, it may be the case that 
how we have conceived of these theories of rationality is fatally flawed, and that our continued 
acceptance of the normative views of the subject restricts the ability of game theory to achieve its 
goal in predicting human behavior and decision making. A closer look at how these predictions 
play out in experimental and real-world settings, as well as an examination of the evolution of 
cooperation discussed in the next section, may be necessary in addressing these constraints. 
 
2.2 The Evolution of Cooperation  
 One of the most common understandings of evolution is that of the “survival of the 
fittest” theory presented most notably by Darwin (1871), that predicates evolution on the 
maintenance and reproduction of only the strongest organisms. Over time, the competitive nature 
of evolution should reward only selfish behavior that increases individual fitness and makes one 
more likely to be selected for by natural selection, while simultaneously phasing out cooperative 
behavior that comes at a personal cost to the cooperator. However, we frequently observe 
cooperation across a range of biological level: genes cooperate in genomes, cells cooperate in 
multicellular organisms, and humans cooperate so frequently that it is the organizing principle of 
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human society (Nowak, 2006). No other organism on Earth engages in the same complex 
interactions of cooperation and defection as humans, and it is understandable why: in the 
simplest sense, evolution via natural selection only favors costly, prosocial behavior when it 
directly increases the chances of propagating one’s own genes (Boyd, 2008). Cooperation in 
nonhuman primates is limited to relatives and small groups of cooperators with which one is 
more likely to share genetic information, setting them apart from humans that frequently display 
cooperative tendencies and interactions with individuals that share no genetic information. That 
cooperation is so central to human nature is confounding to evolutionary biologists considering 
the behaviors of other primates, and the question of how natural selection can lead to cooperative 
behavior has remained a topic of discussion within the discipline for decades. 
 A cooperator is someone who incurs a personal cost to provide some benefit to another 
individual, whereas defectors choose not to incur these costs and in doing so provide no 
additional benefit to others (Nowak, 2006). Cost and benefit in an evolutionary context are 
measured by fitness; rationality in this sense implies maximizing one’s individual fitness at the 
expense of others. In a mixed population of cooperators and defectors, defectors have a higher 
average fitness than cooperators and are thus chosen through natural selection, gradually 
decreasing the relative population of cooperators over time until they vanish entirely from the 
population (Nowak, 2006). A population of only cooperators has the highest average fitness, but 
the introduction of one defector will gradually decease the fitness of the population over time 
until no cooperators remain. Under these assumptions, cooperation is not an evolutionary stable 
strategy because it can be invaded and ultimately eliminated by a strategy of defection. 
 That humans frequently cooperate, then, is confounding considering the constant threat of 
defection throughout evolutionary history. It is possible, however, that the level of cooperative 
12 
 
behavior observed today has been borne out of necessary collaboration required to solve adaptive 
problems inherent to social interaction. Tomasello, Melis, Tennie, Wyman, and Herrmann (2012) 
propose that humans’ unique forms of cognition, communication, and social life all derive from 
our species’ foraging history in which mutualistic collaboration became necessary for the well-
being of both the individual and the partner on whom they were interdependent. In this context, 
humans developed new skills and a motivation of joint intentionality that reinforced cooperative 
behavior with protection against cheaters.  
The authors believe that a second step followed in our evolutionary history in which these 
new skills and motivations because scaled up to the group level as human groups began facing 
competition from other groups. Collaboration within one’s group became necessary for the 
survival of the community and the fitness of its members. The new group-mindedness that 
resulted led to the creation of culture, norms, and institutions driven by shared intentionality that 
required a previously unseen level of collaboration and altruism necessary to sustain human 
sociality (Tomasello, et al., 2012). 
 The belief that modern cooperative tendencies have been borne out of our species’ 
history of necessary collaboration is supported by Tooby, Cosmides, and Price (2006), albeit 
with some variations as to the evolutionary process they believe ultimately led to these 
behaviors. Taking an approach rooted in evolutionary psychology, the authors propose that 
species-typical mechanisms have become incorporated into human architecture by natural 
selection after reliably demonstrating procedures and solutions to adaptive problems faced 
throughout our evolutionary history. The functional logic embodied by these mechanisms is a 
form of evolutionary rationality that the authors call ecological rationality. Their theory of 
ecological rationality deviates from ordinary rationality in several ways, most notably that the 
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human mind has become equipped with psychological adaptations for realizing gains in trade 
that occur in collective action exchanges. In their application of evolutionary psychology, Tooby, 
et al. (2006) find that the traditional view of trade as mechanism of economic rationality is false; 
rather, exchange is a product of evolutionary reasoning specializations tailored by natural 
selection to enable collective parties to solve computational problems specific to social 
exchange. Social exchange is not merely a mechanism for maximizing one’s individual benefit 
as it is believed to be under traditional economics, but instead allows for the emergence of 
solutions to adaptive problems via collective action. 
 General collaborative behavior is insufficient, however, because cooperation is not an 
evolutionary stable strategy; cooperation naturally leads to exposure of defection which can 
invade a population of cooperators and gradually decrease group well-being over time (Nowak, 
2006). While the fitness advantages of exchange are relatively obvious—exchange serves to 
make two parties better off—cooperative behavior must necessarily incorporate the ability to 
detect and defend against cheaters in order to be successful (Tooby, et al., 2006). The 
evolutionary perspective predicts that in order to be selected for, evolutionary mechanisms for 
exchange must incorporate complex, conditional strategies to defend against being outcompeted 
by free riders in collective action. What emerges is strategies that do not simply pick the highest 
absolute payoff, but instead favor practices that lead to higher relative payoffs against exploitive 
strategies even at the expense of some additional payoff. Computational elements designed to 
defend against exploitation are thus an indispensable feature of the mechanisms adapted for 
cooperation and have allowed these complex and seemingly suboptimal strategies to emerge and 
remain stable over time (Tooby, et al, 2006; Danielson, 2002). 
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 Much of the relevant literature on the evolution of cooperation agrees that cooperation 
has only been able to evolve via the development of computational mechanisms necessary to 
solve adaptive problems with defenses against cheaters built in. One of the major contributing 
sources to this body of literature is that of Martin Nowak (2006) who not only includes the 
necessary components of these mechanisms (specifically protection against cheaters) but outlines 
a series of specific conditions that have enabled cooperation to be selected for by natural 
selection in mixed populations that would otherwise be dominated by defectors. These five 
mechanisms—kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity, and 
group selection—are established based on a series of ratios derived from a 2x2 matrix used to 
model the relevant condition for the evolution of cooperation. For example, for natural selection 
to favor cooperation in kin selection, the coefficient of relatedness, r, must be greater than the 
cost-to-benefit ratio of a cooperative act, such that: r > c/b (Nowak, 2006). Relatedness in this 
case is defined as the probability of sharing a gene with the recipient of the altruistic act. 
Similarly, for direct reciprocity to yield stable cooperative strategies the probability of another 
encounter between two individuals, w, must exceed the cost-to-benefit ratio of an altruistic act 
such that: w > c/b. This comparison of the cost-to-benefit ratio to another situational variable is 
consistent for each mechanism. 
The contributions of Nowak (2006) are significant because they build on existing theories 
of the evolution of cooperation by modeling the adaptive problems discussed in Tomasello, et al. 
(2012) and Tooby, et al., (2006), and exemplify the situational mechanisms at work that have 
allowed cooperative behavior to evolve. From these mechanisms, Nowak concludes that 
evolution is constructive because of cooperation that allows for specialization and promotes 
biological diversity. New levels of organization are only able to evolve when competing units on 
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lower levels are able to cooperate, thus making cooperative behavior the underlying factor of the 
“open-endedness of the evolutionary process” and helping to explain why it should not be 
surprising that cooperation has evolved so successfully throughout our species’ history. 
 Evolution is often understood to be naturally driven by competition, yet cooperation 
observed on various biological levels suggests that at some point in our species’ history 
collaborative behavior became necessary for solving adaptive problems faced by our ancestors. 
The solutions produced by the complex mechanism of this collaboration allowed these behaviors 
to be advanced by natural selection, despite the misconception that only selfish behavior serving 
to increase individual fitness should have persisted throughout evolutionary history. Based on the 
evidence suggesting otherwise, Nowak (2006) argues that perhaps “natural cooperation” should 
hereafter be considered as a fundamental principle of evolution for its role as a catalyst of 
evolutionary progress. The experimental results observed in the literature presented in the next 
section support such a fundamental change to our understanding of how behavior has evolved 
throughout our species’ history. 
 
2.3 Social Dilemma Experiments  
 The Prisoner’s Dilemma has long been game theory’s foundational social dilemma model 
because it lends itself to a relatively simple 2x2 matrix in which each player is presented with a 
choice between cooperation or defection. If both players cooperate, they achieve the highest 
collective payoff, but in choosing a cooperative strategy one becomes exposed to the possibility 
of defection from the other player seeking to achieve the highest individual payoff. This is the 
problem characteristic of social dilemmas: cooperation results in the highest collective benefit, 
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but individually rational behavior leads to an outcome in which everyone is worse off than they 
otherwise may have been (Kollock, 1998). 
Surging interest in social dilemmas in recent decades has resulted in a significant body of 
experimental research attempting to model such situations in which individual and collective 
interests are at odds. Among the popular experimental designs used to do so are the Traveler’s 
Dilemma, Public Goods game, and Trust game. Due to the apparent payoff of individually 
beneficial strategies, game theory predicts that instances of cooperation will be low and defective 
strategies will be common, as it is assumed that individuals are both rational and selfish and will 
identify and adhere to strategies for individual utility-maximization (Dawes & Thaler, 1988). 
However, as has been discussed in previous sections, these theoretical predictions are notoriously 
unsuccessful at predicting human behavior in the real world, and a growing body of academic 
disciplines have begun to attempt to identify the reasons for this gap between theoretical 
understandings and observed behavior. This section discusses several social dilemma models and 
laboratory experiments that have produced such results that contradict the so-called “rational” 
predictions of game theory. 
Studies of human behavior in social dilemmas typically explain tendencies to cooperate 
by dividing people into pro-self and prosocial types, or by appealing to forms of external control 
(Capraro 2013). However, numerous experiments have shown that humans may act 
cooperatively even in one-shot social dilemmas without external control, and that the rate of 
cooperation is typically payoff dependent. This eliminates a division between pro-self and 
prosocial individuals as a predictor of human behavior and provides evidence that humans 
instead possess cooperative attitudes by nature. 
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 Capraro (2013) examines the existence of these natural cooperative attitudes and suggests 
that humans do not act as single agents as assumed by economics, but rather develop forecasts 
used to predict how a social dilemma will evolve if coalitions are formed. Humans then act 
according to their most optimized forecast, derived from an evaluation of the probability that 
other players abandon the collective interest. This evaluated probability accounts for the 
likelihood of defective strategies considering the tradeoff between the incentive and risk of doing 
so. As an attempt to model the mental processes that real subjects perform in social dilemmas, 
Capraro believes his model is the first to successfully predict population average behaviors in 
social dilemmas and explain experimental findings in game theory such as those discussed in the 
remainder of this section. 
 Capraro (2013) also cites that the rate of cooperation in experimental games may depend 
on the payoff, and that the same person may change their attitude towards cooperation when the 
payoff of doing so is higher or lower. This phenomenon was examined by Capra, Goeree, 
Gomez, and Holt (1999) using a Traveler’s Dilemma game. The Traveler’s Dilemma—explained 
in greater detail in Chapter 3—involves two players simultaneously claiming a dollar amount 
within a defined interval, with the lower-claiming player being rewarded and the higher-claiming 
player receiving an equal penalty (players who claim the same amount receive neither reward nor 
penalty). Capra et al. used this structure to observe the level of cooperation at different 
penalty/reward values, and found that cooperation in the form of higher claims was greatest at 
lower values (i.e. when the risk and reward of defecting was the smallest) and that as the 
potential penalty for claiming the higher value increased, claims gradually approached the lower 
bound of the interval. One of the key takeaways from this study—both in the scope of this paper 
as well as the broader discussion of rationality within economics—is their observation that 
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cooperation was to an extent maintained at different level depending on the risk of doing so. 
Backward induction in the Traveler’s Dilemma predicts immediate and universal defection that 
results in a Nash equilibrium equal to the minimum possible claim; however, Capra et al. (1999) 
show that the decision between cooperation and defection occurs on a case-by-case basis and 
may incorporates contextual factors that drive us to cooperate even when presented with an 
opportunity to maximize individual benefit via a strategy of defection. 
 Like the Traveler’s Dilemma, the Public Goods game has been used to model the 
anomalous existence of cooperation in social environments according to theoretical predictions. 
One of the most common predictors of behavior in the provision of public goods is the free rider 
hypothesis—that self-interested individuals lack incentives to voluntarily contribute to the 
provision of public goods, and that their failure to contribute is rational (Asch and Gagliotti, 
1991)—though at the time of Marwell and Ames (1981) its acceptance was based on theoretical 
argument rather than empirical results. In their study, Marwell and Ames examined the success 
of two variations of the free rider hypothesis in predicting behavior in a single-trial Public Goods 
game—the strong free rider hypothesis, which predicts that all players will defect and nothing 
will be contributed to the public good, and the weak free rider hypothesis, which predicts some 
players will contribute to the provision of the public good while others will not. The strong free 
rider hypothesis follows the outcome predicted by rational theory, while the weak hypothesis 
does not yield very precise predictions. 
 What Marwell and Ames (1981) found was that the strong free rider hypothesis was 
repeatedly contradicted by their experimental results. Regardless of changes in situational 
variables, players voluntarily contributed an average of 40-60 percent of their resources to the 
public good even though all conditions of the experiment were designed to maximize the 
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occurrence of self-interested strategies. That participants did not contribute the entirety of their 
resources supports the weak free rider hypothesis and proves that free riding does exist on some 
level, but the rate of contribution largely contradicts predictions of universal defection. 
 Similar results were produced in a repeated Public Goods game by Isaac, Walker, and 
Thomas (1984), who found that the level of contributed resources in the first round of a repeated 
game was similar to that of the single trial experiment seen in Marwell and Ames (1981). 
However, the results of Isaac, Walker, and Thomas show a decline in contribution rate over the 
course of these repeated interactions. Dawes and Thaler (1988) suggest that these experiments 
are significant in that they contradict the excessively harsh assumptions of rational game theory. 
While it has been shown that a free rider problem exists, the hypothesis that everyone free rides 
all the time is clearly wrong, as evidenced by the repeated contribution of individuals in a series 
of Public Goods games. There exists a divergence between universal free riding and universally 
optimal contribution, but the motivations for behavior in this middle ground remain 
controversial. 
Further supporting this disparity are a series of Trust Game experiments, most notably 
those of Deck (2009) and Fehr and Rockenbach (2003). The Trust Game has historically been a 
popular experiment in game theory because it lends itself to a relative limited set of strategies. In 
the Trust Game, two players are given an equal endowment of money and a role as either the 
“Investor” or the “Trustee” (Fehr & Rockenbach, 2003). Moving sequentially, the Investor 
chooses how much of their endowment to send to the Trustee, which is increased by a 
predetermined multiplier. Once the money is received by the Trustee, they decide how much of 
this new allocation (equal to their initial endowment plus any contribution by the Investor) to 
send back to the Investor. Game theory predicts that the Investor will keep their entire 
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endowment and send nothing, considering that a “rational” Trustee would simply keep their new 
endowment and return nothing to the Investor (Fehr & Rockenbach, 2003). Any exchange 
between the two players is thus predicated on an Investor’s trust that a share of the new 
endowment will be returned such that both players receive higher earnings than the situation in 
which the Investor sends nothing to the Trustee. However, this initial cooperation by the Investor 
is necessarily risky, leading game theory to predict a Nash equilibrium of zero exchange between 
the two participants. 
 Deck (2009) experimented with the Trust Game in two iterations that differed only in the 
individual payoffs available in each game. The author used different payoff structures to observe 
the frequency of cooperation depending on which player was “productive” (meaning the player 
whose contribution increased total available surplus), and while her specific research question is 
not relevant to this paper, the underlying logic of the game nevertheless remained the same: both 
players benefitted from mutual cooperation, but in sending a share of their endowment to the 
Trustee, the Investor risks losing some or all of their contribution.  
 In the first game, 56% of Investors trusted and 30% of Trustees returned a share of the 
endowment (Deck, 2009). This was statistically similar to the 52% trust and 29% cooperation 
observed in Deck (2001). In the second trust game roughly 26% of Investors trusted, but of those 
53% of Investors received a share of the endowment back. Consistent in these results is that a 
percentage of participants—more than half in the initial trust game—were willing to trust their 
partner despite the risks of doing so. Also of note is that all games lasted only one round, so no 
future benefit of cooperating was present. 
 A trust game similar to the first experiment in Deck (2009) was used by Fehr and 
Rockenbach (2003), though one iteration of this study featured the ability for the Investor to 
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declare a desired “back-transfer” amount and could threaten a fine equal to four monetary units if 
the Trustee sent back less than the desired amount. This added a new dimension to that of the 
traditional Trust game in that now Trustees could be penalized for sending less than the amount 
desired by the Investor, but the Investor’s choice to levy punishment was optional upon sending 
their endowment to the Trustee. 
 Of the 24 total Trustees in the “trust” condition (no option to punish), 19 sent back a 
share of their endowment, while in the “incentive” condition (punishment allowed) 29 of the 45 
Trustees sent back more than four monetary units (equal to the amount of the punishment for not 
returning the desired amount)(Fehr and Rockenbach, 2003). What was interesting is that Trustees 
in the incentive condition were far more generous when Investors chose not to fine them: no 
Trustee who received no threat of punishment sent back zero, and 47% sent back more than 15 
monetary units. The average back transfer in these cases was 12.5 monetary units, compared to 
7.8 and 6 monetary units in the trust condition and the incentive condition with punishment 
chosen, respectively. Thirty-three percent of Trustees threatened with punishment sent back 
nothing, with only 13% electing to return more than 15 monetary units.  
 The results of Fehr and Rockenbach (2003) are especially interesting because they violate 
rationality theory on two distinct levels. Much like in Deck (2009), the results show that first-
mover players are willing to send some or all of their initial endowment to their partner with the 
hopes of increasing surplus for both players despite the inherent risks of doing so, and that their 
partners frequently returned a portion of this endowment despite the cost to themselves. Fehr and 
Rockenbach (2003) believe that these results support the reciprocal nature of human altruism and 
prove that altruism was a significant motivator of behavior in their experimental setting. This 
differs from the idea of “reciprocal altruism” since there was no future interactions between 
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players and thus nothing to be gained from cooperation in the future; however, the significance 
of altruism in this experiment contradicts the predictions of game theory and aligns with the 
analysis of Capraro (2013) in suggesting that individuals possess natural tendencies to cooperate 
that are simply dismissed as irrational by traditional game theory.   
 Fehr and Rockenbach (2003) also observed an added level of seemingly irrational 
behavior within the incentive condition of their experiment. The optional punishment in this 
experiment was used to measure the potential impact of detrimental sanctions on altruistic 
cooperation, measured as the amount sent by the Investor and the amount returned by the Trustee 
(Fehr and Rockenbach, 2003). The authors found that Trustees returned higher back-transfers on 
average when their Investor chose not to fine. Once the initial decision to send money to the 
Trustee was made, experimental results suggest that choosing not to punish would be the payoff-
maximizing behavior for an Investor, yet 30 of 45 Investors chose to punish. The authors 
hypothesized that Investors choosing to threaten punishment despite this resulting in lower back-
transfers on average was the product of two potential factors: preferences for strong reciprocity 
leading Investors to threaten punishment in order to ensure a more even distribution of earnings, 
and the possibility that Investors may not have anticipated the effects of threatening to punish 
their partners. 
 To control for the latter possibility, Fehr and Rockenbach (2003) designed an experiment 
identical to the incentive case but in which players were shown beforehand the effect that 
threatening punishment had on back-transfers in the initial experiment. If Investors’ decisions to 
punish in the initial experiment were caused by false conceptions of the impact of their decision, 
a lower incidence of punishment would likely be observed in the second experiment. However, 
in 50 pairs of participants, 34 Investors chose to punish their partner if they did not receive their 
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desired back-transfer. This led the authors to conclude that preferences for strong reciprocity and 
the desire to punish those seen as cheaters was the motivating factor for players who elected to 
punish their partners. As mentioned in Chapter 2.2, the ability to protect against cheaters in 
social settings has been a fundamental aspect in the evolution of cooperation, and the results of 
Fehr and Rockenbach (2003) support the notion that the desire to punish perceived cheaters is 
one reason why observed behavior frequently deviates from theoretical predictions. 
These experiments have all been used to model the behavior of individuals in collective 
action situations in which the group derives the maximum benefit from universal cooperation, 
but where the benefit-maximizing strategy for the individual is defection. Many of the studies 
discussed thus far modeled collective action dilemmas occurring in small groups, but a 
significant body of literature exists analyzing the “Tragedy of the Commons” theory proposed by 
Garrett Hardin in 1968. Hardin’s essay posed concern about the ability of groups to maintain 
common resources considering the potential for personal gain available at minimal cost for those 
who exploit the freedom of usage that is characteristic of common goods. This essay served as a 
catalyst for investigation of cooperative behavior in collective action problems, most notably 
those such as climate change and the overharvesting of fish that occur on an international scale 
(Diekert, 2012). Hardin’s concern that “freedom in a commons brings ruin to all” is derived from 
Mancur Olson’s “zero contribution thesis” that rational, self-interested individuals in large 
groups in the absence of coercive mechanisms will not act in the interest of the group (i.e. will 
contribute nothing to the collective good) (Olson, 1965). This theory is consistent with those 
fundamental to game theory that predict universal defection in collective action problems. 
In response to this pessimistic view, Ostrom (2000) points out that both laboratory and 
field studies confirm that a large number of collective action problems have been resolved 
24 
 
successfully, and that the notion that groups can find a way to act in their own interest is not 
entirely misguided. That collective action situations may be resolved on their own provides an 
optimistic view compared to that of Olson (1965) and Hardin (1986), and is supported by the 
existing body of experiments that have repeatedly shown that human behavior in the 
experimental setting rarely follows the predictions of rational game theory. The challenge facing 
economists now is identifying the source of this divergence between theory and behavior and 
rethinking the fundamental assumptions that repeatedly fail to predict the behavioral motivations 
of humans. Ostrom calls for future empirical and theoretical work to question the contextual 
variables that affect the processes of evoking, adhering to, and rewarding the use of social norms 
such that we may understand the impact of institutional, cultural, and biophysical contexts on 
collective action situations. Dawes and Thaler (1988) suggest that exploring issues normally 
ignored by economics—specifically what factors determine the rate of cooperation—can help 
establish a better understanding of the problems presented by the Traveler’s Dilemma, Public 
Goods game, Trust game, and other social dilemmas. This is precisely what the rest of this paper 
sets out to do: by exploring potential factors of cooperation in the experimental setting, we hope 
to help explain the motivations of cooperative human behavior that underlie the divergence 
between economic predictions and experimental results. 
 
Chapter 3: Methodology 
 The participants and procedures of the experiments are explained in this chapter, 
followed by a detailed outline of the Traveler’s Dilemma games used to test our three research 
questions. 
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3.1 Participants and Procedures 
 The experiments were conducted at Trinity College in Hartford, Connecticut throughout 
the 2019 fall academic semester running from September 2019 to December 2019. Participants 
were students in Professor Arthur Schneider’s College Course 210: Theory of Games and 
Experimental Game Theory, a laboratory worth 0.5 academic credits that met for 75 minutes 
once a week for 14 weeks. All experiments were conducted within these weekly class periods in 
a computer laboratory. College Course 210 is not classified under a certain major discipline, so 
participants were students of a variety of majors who had voluntarily chosen to register for the 
class.  
Upon attending the first class, students were informed that their participation would be 
part of a series of experiments and were asked permission to use their data, to which all provided 
written consent. At the start of each game, players were given a description of the rules, 
including the length of the game (number of rounds), number of partners they would be matched 
with, and payoff structure. This was then followed by a short exercise with review questions 
designed to ensure that all participants understood the parameters of the game. Students were 
also given the opportunity to ask for clarification regarding these parameters.  
 
3.2 Incentives  
During the first class, students were offered the opportunity to pay an optional laboratory 
fee of $50 which would contribute to a “prize fund.” At the end of the semester, the highest-
placing player from each game who had paid the lab fee at the start of the semester would 
receive a portion of the prize fund, equal to: 
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𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑖𝑛 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐺𝑎𝑚𝑒𝑠 𝑃𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑑
 
Students were informed that the average payout per game has historically averaged roughly 
$100.  
Students were also told that the grading structure of the class would correlate with 
participants’ performance across all games. Fifty percent of participants’ grades were determined 
by their average final placement in all games, with the top 20% of players receiving an A, top 
21-40% receiving an A-, top 41-60% receiving a B+, top 61-80% receiving a B, and the bottom 
20% of players receiving a B-. In addition, a series of grade boosters were in place to reward 
students for individual game performances. This included a “next grade up” boost for 
accomplishments such as first-place finishes, five top-three finishes, and two top-two finishes. 
Thus, while not all participants chose to pay the laboratory fee and had money at stake, all 
players had a similar academic incentive to be competitive. 
 
3.3 Traveler’s Dilemma 
 The data for these experiments were drawn from seven Traveler’s Dilemma games 
conducted over the course of the semester. The first five weeks of the class were designed to 
familiarize students with social dilemma games. During these initial five weeks participants 
played version of the Trust game and Ultimatum game before transitioning to the Traveler’s 
Dilemma from which the experimental data used in this paper were collected. 
In the most basic version of the Traveler’ Dilemma used, groups of two are anonymously 
matched for one treatment lasting six rounds, after which players are randomly assigned a new 
partner. In each round, players simultaneously claim a dollar amount X such that $0.80 ≤ X ≤ 
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$2.00. The player who claims the lower amount receives the amount of their claim plus a 
“reward” equal to $0.20, while the player who claims the higher amount receives the lower 
claim, minus a “penalty” of $0.20. If both players claim the same amount, both are awarded the 
amount of their claim with no additional penalty or reward. An example of the payoff matrix can 
be seen in Figure 1. 
 
 $0.80 $1.20 $1.50 … $1.99 $2.00 
$0.80 $0.80 ; $0.80 $1.00 ; $0.60 $1.00 ; $0.60 … $1.00 ; $0.60 $1.00 ; $0.60 
$1.20 $0.60 ; $1.00 $1.20 ; $1.20 $1.40 ; $1.00 … $1.40 ; $1.00 $1.40 ; $1.00 
$1.50 $0.60 ; $1.00 $1.00 ; $1.40 $1.50 ; $1.50 … $1.70 ; $1.30 $1.70 ; $1.30 
… … … … … … … 
$1.99 $0.60 ; $1.00 $1.00 ; $1.40 $1.30 ; $1.70 … $1.99 ; $1.99  $2.19 ; $1.79 
$2.00 $0.60 ; $1.00 $1.00 ; $1.40 $1.30 ; $1.70 … $1.79 ; $2.19 $2.00 ; $2.00 
 
Figure 1. Payoff matrix for the Traveler’s Dilemma. 
 
From this payoff matrix we observe that a claim X=$2.00 is the cooperative outcome 
because it awards both players $2.00 with no penalty or reward. However, this strategy is 
necessarily risky because it exposes a player to being undercut by their partner with a claim 
X=$1.99, which yields the highest possible individual payoff of $2.19 (and leaves the 
“cooperating” player with a payoff of only $1.79). Players quickly identify both the cooperative 
outcome and profit-maximizing strategy of undercutting their partner, eventually leading the 
game to converge on the game-theoretical Nash equilibrium claim X=$0.80. 
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Our research was conducted over the course of seven weeks using seven unique 
Traveler’s Dilemma games. A “game” in the following sections constitutes a series of 
“treatments”, defined as consecutive rounds in which participants were matched with the same 
partner. A round refers to each individual instance in which a decision was made by all players. 
All games were played using Veconlab, a website created by Professor Charles Holt of the 
University of Virginia (Holt, 2005). The website offers roughly 60 experimental games from 
which researchers can choose and customize the default setting and parameters to fit their 
specific research. In order to test for the effects of intensity of competition, duration, and group 
size, we customized various games by changing number of participants, number of rounds per 
game, and number of players in each group, respectively. All variations of the Traveler’s 
Dilemma used the same base structure mentioned previously—including identical claim interval 
as well as penalty and reward amounts—and differed only in the controlled variable being 
observed. 
The goal of these experiments was to test the impact of intensity of competition, game 
duration, and group size on cooperative behavior in the competitive environment. For the 
purpose of our study, level of cooperation was determined by players’ earnings and claims in 
each game. This is based on the observation that while deviation from the cooperative outcome is 
the individually dominant strategy, defection generally triggers a response of constant 
undercutting that gradually decreases players’ earnings over the course of the game and causes 
per round earnings and claims to converge on a Nash equilibrium of $0.80. In this case, all group 
members are ultimately worse off compared to a situation in which they maintain the cooperative 
outcome of $2.00, leading us to conclude that higher average earnings and claims signal a greater 
level of cooperation. 
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3.3.1 Intensity of Competition 
 To test for the effect of intensity of competition on cooperation we used three Traveler’s 
Dilemma games with elimination rounds. All three games conducted began with an initial group 
of 24 players, and each treatment lasted for a total of six rounds. At the start of each game, 
players were informed that they would be randomly assigned a new group after each treatment, 
and that after the completion of three treatments individual earnings would be aggregated and a 
predetermined number of players with the lowest earnings would be eliminated and would be 
unable to participate for the rest of the game. Participants were also informed that all players’ 
earnings would be reset to zero after each elimination round. The incorporation of elimination 
enabled us to observe the impact on cooperation of increasing the competitiveness of the game 
by periodically eliminating the players with the lowest earnings. 
 Game 1 was played in groups of two for 12 six-round treatments. After every three 
treatments, the four participants with the lowest earnings were eliminated and all players’ 
earnings were reset to zero. This process was repeated three times: after the first elimination 
stage, 20 players remained; after the second elimination stage, 16 players remained; and after the 
third elimination stage, 12 players remained. Finally, the 12 remaining players competed for 
three more treatments, and the player with the highest accumulated earnings in those 18 rounds 
was declared the winner. 
 Games 2 and 3 followed similar structures but differed in group size and number of 
players eliminated at each elimination stage. Game 2 was played in groups of three for nine six-
round treatments. Every three treatments the six players with the lowest earnings were eliminated 
and all earnings were reset to zero. Eliminating six players at each elimination stage instead of 
four as in Game 1 was necessary to ensure remaining players could be divided into groups of 
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three. After the first elimination stage, 18 players remained, and after the second elimination 
stage, 12 players remained. Similar to Game 1, these 12 players then competed for three final 
treatments, and the player with the highest earnings in those treatments was declared the winner. 
 Game 3 was played for nine six-round games in groups of four, with the four lowest 
earners eliminated at each elimination stage such that the remaining players could be divided into 
groups of four participants each. After the first elimination stage, 20 players remained, and after 
the second elimination stage, 16 players remained. The final 16 players then competed for three 
more treatments, and the player with the highest earnings was declared the winner.  
 
3.3.2 Game Duration 
 Using two Traveler’s Dilemma games of different lengths, our goal was to observe the 
impact of longer treatments on cooperation. The parameters in Game 1 were identical to the base 
version of the Traveler’s Dilemma outlined in Chapter 3.3. Twenty-eight initial participants 
played in groups of two for six rounds treatments before being assigned a new partner. This was 
repeated six times for a total of 36 rounds. After the first six treatments were completed, the four 
players with the lowest earnings were eliminated, resulting in 24 remaining players. The 
remaining 24 players then completed six more treatments under an identical structure. 
Game 2 differed only in the number of rounds in each treatment. Instead of six rounds as 
in Game 1, each participant was matched with a partner for 10 rounds before being assigned a 
new partner. Beginning with 28 participants, this was repeated six times for a total of 60 rounds, 
after which the four lowest earners were eliminated. The 24 remaining players then completed an 
additional 60 rounds with a total of six different partners. Increasing the duration of each 
treatment enabled us to observe how cooperation was impacted by the length of interaction 
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between partners. Due to the greater overall quantity of rounds in Game 2, we were required to 
use average earnings and claims per round as a measure for cooperation considering that these 
cumulative values were naturally greater when treatments consisted of 10 rounds. 
 
3.3 Group Size 
 To test for the impact of group size on cooperation we used three basic Traveler’s 
Dilemma games that differed only in the number of players that each participant was grouped 
with in each game. Increasing group size allowed us to observe the effect that working with a 
greater number of players had on cooperation. We used this to study the Tragedy of the 
Commons theory in practice. 
 All three games included 24 participants and were played for six treatments of 10 rounds 
each for a total of 60 rounds. In Game 1, participants played with one partner and received a new 
partner every 10 rounds. In Game 2, participants were matched with two partners and played the 
game in groups of three, with new groups assigned every 10 rounds. Finally, in Game 3 players 
were assigned three partners and participated in groups of four, which were randomly assigned 
every 10 rounds. Participants were never grouped with the same player two treatments in a row; 
however, due to the random nature of group assignment some players were grouped together 
more than once, but groups were always anonymous and players had no means of identifying 
members of their group. 
 
Chapter 4: Results 
This chapter presents the results of our three experiments and analyzes the impact of 
intensity of competition, game duration, and group size on cooperation. One of the drawbacks of 
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our study was that the experiments were conducted over the course of several class periods, 
which occasionally resulted in different participants for each individual game within a specific 
experimental test due to student absences that were outside of our control. In order to control for 
this, all data used were taken only from players who participated in every game used to test a 
specific factor of cooperation. As such, all results and sample sizes presented in this chapter 
represent the number of common participants in each experimental test.  
 
4.1 Intensity of Competition 
 Pairwise comparisons between individual treatments within each game were computed 
using a series of repeated measures ANOVA tests. These tests were designed to measure the 
significance of difference in mean earnings and mean claims for the 12 common players who 
participated in all three games. We consider results to be statistically significant at p<.05. Results 
for intensity of competition are reported in Appendix A. 
The results for intensity of competition were largely inconsistent and did not support out 
initial hypothesis that increasing the intensity of competition would have a significant impact on 
level of cooperation. In Game 1, we observed a downward trend in both earnings and claims as 
the game progressed and fewer players remained, suggesting that cooperation was negatively 
correlated with the intensity of competition. This decline was shown to be statistically significant 
only for claims, however, as the difference in average earnings across 12 treatments was not 
statistically significant in any case. All pairwise comparisons of mean earnings reflected a 
significance p>.05 (Table 1). We found the decline in average claims to be statistically 
significant (p<.05) in 9 of 16 cases when comparing Treatments 1-4 with Treatments 9-12 (Table 
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2). These results reflect more frequent deviation from the cooperative claim of $2.00 as players 
were eliminated and the intensity of competition increased. 
 Similar downward trends were observed in Game 2 with groups of three participants. We 
found the decline in average earnings and average claims over the course of Game 2 to be 
statistically significant in both cases. As shown in Table 3, when comparing average earnings in 
Treatments 1-4 with Treatments 6-9 we observe statistical significance in 12 of 16 cases. When 
comparing those same treatments for average claims, this relationship is found to be statistically 
significant in 14 of 16 pairwise comparisons (Table 4). These results suggest that the intensity of 
competition did have an impact on level of cooperation when the game was played in groups of 
three. 
 However, the results found in Game 3 with groups of four deviated considerably from 
those observed in Games 1 and 2. In Game 3, we observed an increase in earning and claims 
over the course of the game, which is especially puzzling as this suggests that cooperation 
became more common in larger groups as the intensity of competition increased. While puzzling, 
the upward trend in earnings and claims shown in Figure 2 and Figure 3 (Appendix D) was 
found not to be statistically significant (p>.05) in all cases for both average earnings and average 
claims (Table 5, Table 6). One explanation for this pattern may be that players expected 
cooperation to disappear quickly in groups of four and believed their only chance to win was 
through sustained cooperation. However, this explanation is contradicted by the results presented 
in Chapter 4.3. 
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4.2 Game Duration 
 Using paired sample T-Tests to compare average earnings and average claims per round 
for the 19 common players in Games 1 and 2 (N=19), we observed that both average earnings 
per round and average claims per round were positively correlated to number of rounds, and that 
this correlation was statistically significant (p<.05) in three out of four cases. In treatments of 28 
players this relationship was shown to be statistically significant for both average earnings and 
average claims (Table 7, Table 8, Appendix B). We observed nearly identical results for both 
relationships (p<.01), leading us to conclude that duration had a strong impact on cooperation in 
treatments of 28 participants. 
 Similar results were observed for average earnings in treatments of 24 players. 
Comparing average earnings across Games 1 and 2, we found the increase in average earnings in 
Game 2 to be statistically significant (p=.015). These results can be seen in Table 9. However, 
unlike in treatments of 28 participants, the relationship between game duration and average 
claims per round did not follow a similar pattern. While average claims per round were slightly 
higher in Game 2, this increase was not statistically significant (p=.249), as shown in Table 10. 
 That average claims per round in treatments of 24 players were not significantly impacted 
by game duration is puzzling considering the significance between duration and average earnings 
for those same treatments. One possible explanation is the role of learning, that the remaining 24 
players in each game had developed an understanding of how to successfully cooperate and had 
adopted strategies for doing so, resulting in only slight increases in average claims in Game 2. 
Unfortunately, this explanation fails to address the significant relationship between duration and 
average earnings per round for those same treatments. However, the fact that average earnings 
and average claims increased in Game 2 for treatments of 28 and 24, and that this increase was 
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found to be statistically significant in three out of four cases leads us to conclude that game 
duration has a significant impact on cooperation. 
 
4.3 Group Size 
Consistent with the fundamental predictions of the Tragedy of the Commons, our results 
show a negative relationship between group size and individuals’ total earnings and claims per 
game. This follows the theory that cooperation becomes increasingly difficult to maintain as 
additional agents are added to a social dilemma. Our findings suggest that as group size 
increases, players defect from the cooperative claim of $2.00 in earlier rounds, resulting in lower 
earnings and claims when compared with groups of two. 
 The significant difference in earnings across the three treatments is confirmed by the 
repeated measures ANOVA test for the 14 players who participated in all games (N=14). The 
decrease in earnings was statistically significant for all pairwise comparisons of the three games 
conducted (p<.01, Table 11, Appendix C), and the downward trend in earnings as group size 
increased is shown in Figure 4 (Appendix D). The increasing difficulty in maintaining 
cooperation as group size increased can be attributed to the fact that the defection of one player 
penalizes all other groupmates, thus establishing an incentive to be the first to defect as a means 
of ensuring reward and avoiding the penalty incurred by not claiming the lowest amount. 
 Nearly identical results are presented in Table 12, which shows the negative relationship 
between group size and total claims. This relationship was statistically significant for all pairwise 
comparisons (p<.01) and can be observed in Figure 5. The significant difference in claims across 
the three games is consistent with our hypothesis that players in larger groups will deviate from 
the cooperative claim X=$2.00 in earlier rounds when compared to groups of two and three, 
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resulting in lower cumulative claims over the course of the game. The results for earnings and 
claims demonstrate a strong negative relationship between group size and total earnings and 
claims and have led us to conclude that group size has a significant impact on cooperation. 
 
Chapter 5: Discussion 
5.1 Intensity of Competition 
 Overall, the direction of the correlation between intensity of competition and cooperation 
observed was inconsistent across the three experimental games conducted. In Games 1 and 2, 
players cooperated less as participants with the lowest earnings were gradually eliminated and 
the game became more competitive. This resulted in both lower average earnings and average 
claims as the intensity of competition increased, which was consistent with our hypothesis that 
increasing the intensity of competition would put greater pressure on players to try and undercut 
their partners in order to earn the reward of $0.20 each round, thus ensuring higher per-round 
earnings than their partners. 
However, this pattern did not hold for Game 3, in which we observed increasing average 
earnings and average claims as players were gradually eliminated. In groups of four, players 
cooperated more frequently as the game progressed and players were eliminated, as evidenced by 
higher earnings and average claims per round in later treatments. However, that the increase in 
average claims and earnings in Game 3 was not statistically significant in any case suggests that 
the cooperative behavior observed may be attributable to the small sample size used. With only 
16 participants split into four groups in the final three treatments of Game 3, it is possible that 
the behavior of one group could have had a considerable impact on overall results. Due to the 
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small sample size, a high level of cooperation in one group may have skewed the results and 
undermines the confidence of our conclusions. 
While the positive correlations between earnings, claims, and intensity of competition 
observed in Game 3 were found not to be statistically significant, their stark deviation from the 
results of Games 1 and 2 led us to conclude that the relationship between intensity of competition 
and cooperation was too inconsistent to be confidently determined as significant. However, that 
the negative correlation between the intensity of competition and cooperation was statistically 
significant in Games 1 and 2 suggests that future tests of larger sample size may yield results in 
support of our initial hypothesis. A larger sample size would reduce the impact of an individual 
group’s behavior on the overall results, thus allowing for more confident conclusions to be 
drawn about the significance of any perceived relationships. 
 
5.2 Duration 
 The direction of correlation between game duration and cooperation was consistent 
across all four cases analyzed. Players maintained a higher level of cooperation with their partner 
when matched with them for 10 rounds (Game 2) as opposed to six rounds in Game 1. These 
findings support our hypothesis that players cooperate with greater frequency in longer 
interactions, as more extensive interactions provide players with greater opportunity to establish 
a reputation as a cooperative partner. Additionally, early defection in longer interactions leads to 
a more drawn-out pattern of retaliatory defection in response to the initial deviation, which 
serves to greatly reduce the overall earnings of both players. Thus, it is unsurprising that the 
positive correlation between duration and cooperation was statistically significant in three out of 
four cases. 
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  The one case in which this relationship was found not to be statistically significant—
average claims of the final 24 participants (Table 10, Appendix B)—is puzzling considering that 
earnings and claims often mirror one another, with per-round earnings rarely deviating much 
from claims. Over the course of the game, total earnings and claims tend to converge on one 
another; however, a considerable disparity between the two can occur in cases where a player is 
consistently undercut by their partners, causing that player to receive the lower claim minus the 
penalty of $0.20. A more likely explanation for the observed insignificance is that by the final 
rounds of Game 2, players understood the general strategy of the game, resulting in players 
consistently choosing the cooperative claim of $2.00. The mean claim in Game 2, round of 24 
players was higher than that of Game 1, reflecting the positive correlation between duration and 
earnings and claims observed in all cases. Thus, while statistical significance was observed in 
only three of four comparisons, this consistent positive relationship has led us to conclude that 
length of social interaction has a significant impact on cooperation in social dilemmas. 
 
5.3 Group Size 
 The negative correlation observed between cooperation and group size reflects that 
players claimed and subsequently earned less on average when partnered with a greater number 
of players. These results support our hypothesis that cooperation would become increasingly 
difficult to maintain as groups gradually increased in size and players began participating with 
more players simultaneously in each round. These results are unsurprising considering that larger 
groups increase the chance that another player defects from the cooperative claim, resulting in 
penalty for every other member of the group. This added pressure makes cooperation difficult by 
incentivizing players to ensure they avoid being penalized by being the first person to defect. 
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While deviating from the cooperative outcome makes all players worse off, a strategy of 
consistently claiming the lowest amount guarantees that a player earns no less than the other 
members of their group. 
 One of the major differences observed across the three games was the speed and severity 
of defection following the initial deviation from the cooperative claim. In Game 1, players were 
often able to maintain cooperation for as many as seven rounds, after which we observed a 
gradual deviation from $2.00 over the course of the remaining rounds. In only a few rare 
instances we observed the minimum claim of $0.80. However, as group size increased, the initial 
defection occurred earlier, and the undercutting that followed happened much more quickly. In 
Game 3, cooperation often survived for as many as five rounds, but what followed was a swift 
decline in claims that quickly resulted in the Nash equilibrium of $0.80. Our observation that 
claims declined much more quickly in larger groups is unsurprising considering that to avoid 
penalty a player must claim a lower amount than all other group members, causing them to 
decrease their claims by a greater degree when competing against a larger number of players. 
 That cooperation became so difficult to maintain in larger groups offers clear support for 
the Tragedy of the Commons theory of shared resources presented by Garret Hardin (1968). Our 
experiment on group size modeled the sort of collective action problem Hardin is concerned with 
in which the benefit-maximizing behavior of the individual differs from that which is in the best 
interest of the group (behavior that contributes to the maintenance of the common resource). We 
observed players deviate from the cooperative claim in pursuit of self-interest, and this defection 
triggered similar strategies in other participants that ultimately made all players worse off. This 
was precisely what Hardin (1968) predicted with his famous line “freedom in a commons brings 
ruin to all,” the implications of which still exist today in modern collective actions dilemmas 
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such as overfishing and climate change. While our experiments demonstrate support for the 
Tragedy of the Commons, they do not address potential solutions to the seemingly inevitable 
consequences of common resource dilemmas. Questions for future research regarding the 
Tragedy of the Commons may focus on potential mechanisms or institutions necessary to 
mitigate the effects of such problems by aligning individual interests with that of the collective 
group. 
 Our results also support Ostrom (2000) in suggesting that the concerns of Olson (1965) 
are overly pessimistic in predicting that individuals in large groups will never contribute for the 
benefit of the group in the absence of coercive mechanisms. Even in Game 3, we observe a 
period of cooperation before the initial defection, which offers reason for optimism that some 
level of cooperation can be maintained even when individual interests are at odds with those of 
the collective group. This is further supported by a significant body of experimental literature 
including Isaac, Walker, and Thomas (1984), Isaac and Walker (1988), Deck (2001; 2009), and 
Fehr and Rockenbach (2003) that all demonstrate cooperation in competitive environments. 
These results support Ostrom’s calls for greater empirical and theoretical work regarding the 
factors of cooperation, a topic that will hopefully see continue exploration in the future. Doing so 
will allow us to grow our understanding of cooperative behavior and how we can incentivize 
cooperation in the face of individual maximization encouraged by natural competition. 
 
Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 Game theory predicts that rational agents in collective action dilemmas will behave in 
such a way as to maximize individual benefit at the expense of others (Dawes & Thaler, 1988). 
Under such assumptions, cooperation is seen as impossible to maintain, as it exposes the group 
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to the risk of so-called “rational” defection. However, both laboratory experiments and everyday 
behavior have repeatedly demonstrated that humans are willing to cooperate in competitive 
environments even when that cooperation comes at a personal cost. While this cooperative 
behavior has been identified, the motivators of such behavior have remained largely speculative. 
 The results of our experiments support the existing body of literature in suggesting that 
cooperation can exist even in competitive environments. We observed periods of cooperation in 
each game regardless of game parameters, and only observed the Nash equilibrium of $0.80 in a 
few rare cases under greater pressure. This supported our general hypothesis that participants 
would exhibit tendencies to cooperate that contradict the behavioral predictions of game theory. 
 We also found evidence to support two of our three hypotheses regarding potential 
factors that contribute to cooperation in competitive environments. We found the impact on 
cooperation to be significant for both game duration and group size. Our results from these two 
experiments showed that players were more willing to cooperate when length of interaction was 
longer, and when group sizes were smaller. Our findings for game duration suggest that players 
in longer interactions are aware of the lasting consequence of deviation from the cooperative 
claim, leading to a longer period of sustained cooperation compared to shorter games in which 
the consequences of defecting are not as extensive. 
 Our findings for group size—that cooperation disappeared much more quickly as groups 
got larger—supports both our initial hypothesis as well as the Tragedy of the Commons theory 
regarding the maintenance and sustainability of common resources. We observed a period of 
cooperation in all games regardless of group size, but as group sizes increased, we saw deviation 
from the cooperative claim occur earlier and with much greater consequences. The increasing 
pressure of additional groupmates led players to defect earlier to avoid incurring the penalty, and 
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heightened competition caused per-round claims to decline rapidly following the initial 
deviation. These findings were especially notable as a model for common resource dilemmas in 
which the agents responsible for the maintenance of a common resource have a personal 
incentive to deviate from the cooperative outcome, either through overuse or free-riding on the 
contributions of others. Further research into this topic should include investigation of potential 
mechanisms that may offer a solution to these collective action problems such that we may be 
able to mitigate their seemingly inevitable consequences in the future. 
 Finally, while our results were inconclusive regarding the impact of intensity of 
competition on cooperation, it is possible that the lack of significance was a product of our 
limited sample size, and that a relationship between the two may still exist. We observed 
negative correlation between intensity of competition and cooperation in Games 1 and 2, but 
these results were not consistent with those of Game 3. The drawbacks of our experiment did not 
allow us to confidently conclude intensity of competition to be a factor of cooperation, but future 
investigation into this relationship may be better positioned to observe a more significant 
relationship. 
 Overall, our results have shown broadly that cooperation is possible to an extent in 
competitive environments, while also demonstrating a significant relationship between both 
duration of interaction and group size on cooperative behavior. We believe these findings 
provide foundation for future study into the underlying motivations of cooperation that will 
allow for better understanding of (1) why we behave cooperatively and (2) how we can use these 
patterns of cooperation to encourage similar behavior in competitive social settings.  
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Appendix A 
Table 1. Repeated Measures ANOVA for Intensity of Competition Game 1: Average Earnings 
Per Treatment. 
Pairwise Comparisons 
Treatment  Mean Difference Std. Error Sig.a 95% Confidence Interval for Differencea 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 2 .190 .219 1.000 -.818 1.198 
3 .122 .224 1.000 -.910 1.153 
4 .108 .216 1.000 -.889 1.104 
5 .443 .237 1.000 -.649 1.536 
6 .452 .240 1.000 -.655 1.558 
7 .475 .271 1.000 -.775 1.725 
8 .377 .298 1.000 -.996 1.749 
9 .505 .229 1.000 -.551 1.561 
10 .496 .213 1.000 -.486 1.477 
11 .554 .172 .536 -.238 1.346 
12 .873 .294 .847 -.482 2.227 
2 1 -.190 .219 1.000 -1.198 .818 
3 -.068 .193 1.000 -.955 .819 
4 -.083 .204 1.000 -1.023 .858 
5 .253 .262 1.000 -.953 1.460 
6 .262 .225 1.000 -.775 1.299 
7 .285 .198 1.000 -.628 1.198 
8 .187 .259 1.000 -1.008 1.381 
9 .315 .209 1.000 -.650 1.280 
10 .306 .207 1.000 -.648 1.259 
11 .364 .181 1.000 -.471 1.199 
12 .682 .224 .736 -.350 1.715 
3 1 -.122 .224 1.000 -1.153 .910 
2 .068 .193 1.000 -.819 .955 
4 -.014 .157 1.000 -.739 .710 
5 .322 .208 1.000 -.634 1.278 
6 .330 .240 1.000 -.774 1.434 
7 .353 .136 1.000 -.275 .982 
8 .255 .243 1.000 -.866 1.376 
9 .383 .158 1.000 -.344 1.111 
10 .374 .192 1.000 -.509 1.258 
11 .432 .191 1.000 -.446 1.311 
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12 .751 .246 .722 -.381 1.883 
4 1 -.108 .216 1.000 -1.104 .889 
2 .083 .204 1.000 -.858 1.023 
3 .014 .157 1.000 -.710 .739 
5 .336 .230 1.000 -.722 1.393 
6 .344 .207 1.000 -.610 1.298 
7 .367 .223 1.000 -.659 1.394 
8 .269 .119 1.000 -.278 .817 
9 .398 .157 1.000 -.324 1.119 
10 .388 .222 1.000 -.632 1.409 
11 .447 .208 1.000 -.512 1.405 
12 .765 .203 .204 -.169 1.699 
5 1 -.443 .237 1.000 -1.536 .649 
2 -.253 .262 1.000 -1.460 .953 
3 -.322 .208 1.000 -1.278 .634 
4 -.336 .230 1.000 -1.393 .722 
6 .008 .255 1.000 -1.165 1.182 
7 .032 .197 1.000 -.874 .938 
8 -.067 .325 1.000 -1.563 1.430 
9 .062 .146 1.000 -.609 .733 
10 .053 .197 1.000 -.857 .962 
11 .111 .212 1.000 -.865 1.087 
12 .429 .219 1.000 -.579 1.437 
6 1 -.452 .240 1.000 -1.558 .655 
2 -.262 .225 1.000 -1.299 .775 
3 -.330 .240 1.000 -1.434 .774 
4 -.344 .207 1.000 -1.298 .610 
5 -.008 .255 1.000 -1.182 1.165 
7 .023 .204 1.000 -.917 .964 
8 -.075 .274 1.000 -1.337 1.187 
9 .053 .192 1.000 -.830 .937 
10 .044 .187 1.000 -.819 .908 
11 .102 .256 1.000 -1.076 1.281 
12 .421 .269 1.000 -.820 1.662 
7 1 -.475 .271 1.000 -1.725 .775 
2 -.285 .198 1.000 -1.198 .628 
3 -.353 .136 1.000 -.982 .275 
4 -.367 .223 1.000 -1.394 .659 
5 -.032 .197 1.000 -.938 .874 
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6 -.023 .204 1.000 -.964 .917 
8 -.098 .311 1.000 -1.531 1.334 
9 .030 .149 1.000 -.658 .718 
10 .021 .160 1.000 -.715 .757 
11 .079 .231 1.000 -.983 1.141 
12 .398 .238 1.000 -.700 1.495 
8 1 -.377 .298 1.000 -1.749 .996 
2 -.187 .259 1.000 -1.381 1.008 
3 -.255 .243 1.000 -1.376 .866 
4 -.269 .119 1.000 -.817 .278 
5 .067 .325 1.000 -1.430 1.563 
6 .075 .274 1.000 -1.187 1.337 
7 .098 .311 1.000 -1.334 1.531 
9 .128 .246 1.000 -1.003 1.259 
10 .119 .287 1.000 -1.204 1.442 
11 .177 .287 1.000 -1.143 1.498 
12 .496 .249 1.000 -.651 1.643 
9 1 -.505 .229 1.000 -1.561 .551 
2 -.315 .209 1.000 -1.280 .650 
3 -.383 .158 1.000 -1.111 .344 
4 -.398 .157 1.000 -1.119 .324 
5 -.062 .146 1.000 -.733 .609 
6 -.053 .192 1.000 -.937 .830 
7 -.030 .149 1.000 -.718 .658 
8 -.128 .246 1.000 -1.259 1.003 
10 -.009 .169 1.000 -.787 .768 
11 .049 .235 1.000 -1.033 1.131 
12 .367 .156 1.000 -.349 1.084 
10 1 -.496 .213 1.000 -1.477 .486 
2 -.306 .207 1.000 -1.259 .648 
3 -.374 .192 1.000 -1.258 .509 
4 -.388 .222 1.000 -1.409 .632 
5 -.053 .197 1.000 -.962 .857 
6 -.044 .187 1.000 -.908 .819 
7 -.021 .160 1.000 -.757 .715 
8 -.119 .287 1.000 -1.442 1.204 
9 .009 .169 1.000 -.768 .787 
11 .058 .204 1.000 -.879 .996 
12 .377 .249 1.000 -.770 1.523 
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11 1 -.554 .172 .536 -1.346 .238 
2 -.364 .181 1.000 -1.199 .471 
3 -.432 .191 1.000 -1.311 .446 
4 -.447 .208 1.000 -1.405 .512 
5 -.111 .212 1.000 -1.087 .865 
6 -.102 .256 1.000 -1.281 1.076 
7 -.079 .231 1.000 -1.141 .983 
8 -.177 .287 1.000 -1.498 1.143 
9 -.049 .235 1.000 -1.131 1.033 
10 -.058 .204 1.000 -.996 .879 
12 .318 .261 1.000 -.882 1.519 
12 1 -.873 .294 .847 -2.227 .482 
2 -.682 .224 .736 -1.715 .350 
3 -.751 .246 .722 -1.883 .381 
4 -.765 .203 .204 -1.699 .169 
5 -.429 .219 1.000 -1.437 .579 
6 -.421 .269 1.000 -1.662 .820 
7 -.398 .238 1.000 -1.495 .700 
8 -.496 .249 1.000 -1.643 .651 
9 -.367 .156 1.000 -1.084 .349 
10 -.377 .249 1.000 -1.523 .770 
11 -.318 .261 1.000 -1.519 .882 
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Table 2. Repeated Measures ANOVA for Intensity of Competition Game 1: Average Claims Per 
Treatment. 
Pairwise Comparisons 
Treatment  Mean Difference Std. Error Sig.b 95% Confidence Interval for Differenceb 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 2 .010 .013 1.000 -.050 .070 
3 .015 .017 1.000 -.063 .093 
4 .022 .012 1.000 -.032 .075 
5 .061 .018 .450 -.024 .145 
6 .042 .014 .773 -.022 .105 
7 .082 .026 .603 -.038 .201 
8 .065 .028 1.000 -.064 .194 
9 .086* .018 .042 .002 .170 
10 .081 .020 .114 -.010 .171 
11 .091* .015 .006 .021 .161 
12 .132 .029 .053 -.001 .264 
2 1 -.010 .013 1.000 -.070 .050 
3 .005 .009 1.000 -.038 .048 
4 .012 .014 1.000 -.054 .077 
5 .051 .021 1.000 -.046 .148 
6 .032 .010 .563 -.014 .077 
7 .072 .021 .398 -.026 .169 
8 .055 .026 1.000 -.065 .175 
9 .076 .017 .052 .000 .152 
10 .071 .016 .068 -.003 .145 
11 .081* .010 .001 .033 .128 
12 .122* .021 .007 .026 .217 
3 1 -.015 .017 1.000 -.093 .063 
2 -.005 .009 1.000 -.048 .038 
4 .007 .015 1.000 -.062 .075 
5 .046 .019 1.000 -.039 .131 
6 .027 .012 1.000 -.026 .080 
7 .067 .018 .214 -.015 .149 
8 .050 .027 1.000 -.075 .175 
9 .071* .014 .028 .005 .137 
10 .066* .013 .018 .008 .124 
11 .076* .013 .009 .015 .137 
12 .117* .018 .003 .032 .201 
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4 1 -.022 .012 1.000 -.075 .032 
2 -.012 .014 1.000 -.077 .054 
3 -.007 .015 1.000 -.075 .062 
5 .039 .017 1.000 -.041 .119 
6 .020 .014 1.000 -.043 .083 
7 .060 .019 .607 -.028 .148 
8 .043 .030 1.000 -.095 .181 
9 .064* .012 .021 .007 .122 
10 .059 .016 .217 -.014 .132 
11 .069 .018 .150 -.012 .150 
12 .110 .026 .088 -.009 .229 
5 1 -.061 .018 .450 -.145 .024 
2 -.051 .021 1.000 -.148 .046 
3 -.046 .019 1.000 -.131 .039 
4 -.039 .017 1.000 -.119 .041 
6 -.019 .020 1.000 -.110 .071 
7 .021 .018 1.000 -.064 .105 
8 .004 .028 1.000 -.125 .134 
9 .025 .012 1.000 -.030 .080 
10 .020 .013 1.000 -.040 .080 
11 .030 .018 1.000 -.053 .113 
12 .071 .024 .952 -.042 .183 
6 1 -.042 .014 .773 -.105 .022 
2 -.032 .010 .563 -.077 .014 
3 -.027 .012 1.000 -.080 .026 
4 -.020 .014 1.000 -.083 .043 
5 .019 .020 1.000 -.071 .110 
7 .040 .022 1.000 -.063 .143 
8 .023 .024 1.000 -.088 .135 
9 .044 .015 .959 -.026 .114 
10 .039 .015 1.000 -.028 .106 
11 .049 .013 .250 -.013 .111 
12 .090* .019 .047 .001 .179 
7 1 -.082 .026 .603 -.201 .038 
2 -.072 .021 .398 -.169 .026 
3 -.067 .018 .214 -.149 .015 
4 -.060 .019 .607 -.148 .028 
5 -.021 .018 1.000 -.105 .064 
6 -.040 .022 1.000 -.143 .063 
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8 -.017 .036 1.000 -.183 .150 
9 .004 .013 1.000 -.057 .066 
10 -.001 .017 1.000 -.078 .076 
11 .009 .022 1.000 -.092 .110 
12 .050 .021 1.000 -.049 .149 
8 1 -.065 .028 1.000 -.194 .064 
2 -.055 .026 1.000 -.175 .065 
3 -.050 .027 1.000 -.175 .075 
4 -.043 .030 1.000 -.181 .095 
5 -.004 .028 1.000 -.134 .125 
6 -.023 .024 1.000 -.135 .088 
7 .017 .036 1.000 -.150 .183 
9 .021 .029 1.000 -.113 .154 
10 .016 .022 1.000 -.087 .119 
11 .026 .023 1.000 -.080 .132 
12 .067 .025 1.000 -.051 .184 
9 1 -.086* .018 .042 -.170 -.002 
2 -.076 .017 .052 -.152 .000 
3 -.071* .014 .028 -.137 -.005 
4 -.064* .012 .021 -.122 -.007 
5 -.025 .012 1.000 -.080 .030 
6 -.044 .015 .959 -.114 .026 
7 -.004 .013 1.000 -.066 .057 
8 -.021 .029 1.000 -.154 .113 
10 -.005 .010 1.000 -.049 .039 
11 .005 .014 1.000 -.062 .072 
12 .046 .021 1.000 -.050 .142 
10 1 -.081 .020 .114 -.171 .010 
2 -.071 .016 .068 -.145 .003 
3 -.066* .013 .018 -.124 -.008 
4 -.059 .016 .217 -.132 .014 
5 -.020 .013 1.000 -.080 .040 
6 -.039 .015 1.000 -.106 .028 
7 .001 .017 1.000 -.076 .078 
8 -.016 .022 1.000 -.119 .087 
9 .005 .010 1.000 -.039 .049 
11 .010 .013 1.000 -.050 .070 
12 .051 .016 .529 -.022 .123 
11 1 -.091* .015 .006 -.161 -.021 
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2 -.081* .010 .001 -.128 -.033 
3 -.076* .013 .009 -.137 -.015 
4 -.069 .018 .150 -.150 .012 
5 -.030 .018 1.000 -.113 .053 
6 -.049 .013 .250 -.111 .013 
7 -.009 .022 1.000 -.110 .092 
8 -.026 .023 1.000 -.132 .080 
9 -.005 .014 1.000 -.072 .062 
10 -.010 .013 1.000 -.070 .050 
12 .041 .021 1.000 -.055 .137 
12 1 -.132 .029 .053 -.264 .001 
2 -.122* .021 .007 -.217 -.026 
3 -.117* .018 .003 -.201 -.032 
4 -.110 .026 .088 -.229 .009 
5 -.071 .024 .952 -.183 .042 
6 -.090* .019 .047 -.179 -.001 
7 -.050 .021 1.000 -.149 .049 
8 -.067 .025 1.000 -.184 .051 
9 -.046 .021 1.000 -.142 .050 
10 -.051 .016 .529 -.123 .022 
11 -.041 .021 1.000 -.137 .055 
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Table 3. Repeated Measures ANOVA for Intensity of Competition Game 2: Average Earnings 
Per Treatment. 
Pairwise Comparisons 
Treatment  Mean Difference Std. Error Sig.b 95% Confidence Interval for Differenceb 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 2 .324 .209 1.000 -.560 1.208 
3 .626 .230 .719 -.350 1.602 
4 .628 .231 .722 -.352 1.607 
5 1.006* .204 .016 .142 1.870 
6 1.657* .196 .000 .828 2.487 
7 1.519* .183 .000 .743 2.296 
8 1.343* .174 .000 .605 2.080 
9 1.755* .207 .000 .878 2.632 
2 1 -.324 .209 1.000 -1.208 .560 
3 .302 .228 1.000 -.666 1.270 
4 .303 .176 1.000 -.444 1.051 
5 .682 .185 .129 -.102 1.465 
6 1.333* .278 .020 .154 2.512 
7 1.195* .248 .019 .142 2.248 
8 1.018* .221 .027 .083 1.954 
9 1.431* .277 .011 .254 2.607 
3 1 -.626 .230 .719 -1.602 .350 
2 -.302 .228 1.000 -1.270 .666 
4 .002 .223 1.000 -.944 .947 
5 .380 .193 1.000 -.439 1.199 
6 1.032 .315 .265 -.302 2.366 
7 .893 .334 .775 -.522 2.308 
8 .717 .217 .251 -.202 1.635 
9 1.129* .165 .001 .428 1.831 
4 1 -.628 .231 .722 -1.607 .352 
2 -.303 .176 1.000 -1.051 .444 
3 -.002 .223 1.000 -.947 .944 
5 .378 .249 1.000 -.679 1.435 
6 1.030* .240 .045 .014 2.046 
7 .892 .234 .104 -.100 1.884 
8 .715* .127 .005 .178 1.252 
9 1.127* .200 .005 .281 1.974 
5 1 -1.006* .204 .016 -1.870 -.142 
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2 -.682 .185 .129 -1.465 .102 
3 -.380 .193 1.000 -1.199 .439 
4 -.378 .249 1.000 -1.435 .679 
6 .652 .334 1.000 -.764 2.068 
7 .513 .321 1.000 -.846 1.873 
8 .337 .245 1.000 -.701 1.375 
9 .749 .260 .542 -.355 1.853 
6 1 -1.657* .196 .000 -2.487 -.828 
2 -1.333* .278 .020 -2.512 -.154 
3 -1.032 .315 .265 -2.366 .302 
4 -1.030* .240 .045 -2.046 -.014 
5 -.652 .334 1.000 -2.068 .764 
7 -.138 .114 1.000 -.620 .344 
8 -.315 .205 1.000 -1.182 .552 
9 .098 .227 1.000 -.865 1.060 
7 1 -1.519* .183 .000 -2.296 -.743 
2 -1.195* .248 .019 -2.248 -.142 
3 -.893 .334 .775 -2.308 .522 
4 -.892 .234 .104 -1.884 .100 
5 -.513 .321 1.000 -1.873 .846 
6 .138 .114 1.000 -.344 .620 
8 -.177 .204 1.000 -1.043 .689 
9 .236 .278 1.000 -.943 1.415 
8 1 -1.343* .174 .000 -2.080 -.605 
2 -1.018* .221 .027 -1.954 -.083 
3 -.717 .217 .251 -1.635 .202 
4 -.715* .127 .005 -1.252 -.178 
5 -.337 .245 1.000 -1.375 .701 
6 .315 .205 1.000 -.552 1.182 
7 .177 .204 1.000 -.689 1.043 
9 .412 .147 .625 -.213 1.038 
9 1 -1.755* .207 .000 -2.632 -.878 
2 -1.431* .277 .011 -2.607 -.254 
3 -1.129* .165 .001 -1.831 -.428 
4 -1.127* .200 .005 -1.974 -.281 
5 -.749 .260 .542 -1.853 .355 
6 -.098 .227 1.000 -1.060 .865 
7 -.236 .278 1.000 -1.415 .943 
8 -.412 .147 .625 -1.038 .213 
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Table 4. Repeated Measures ANOVA for Intensity of Competition Game 2: Average Claims Per 
Treatment. 
Pairwise Comparisons 
Treatment  Mean Difference Std. Error Sig.b 95% Confidence Interval for Differenceb 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 2 .065 .021 .375 -.024 .154 
3 .118* .021 .006 .028 .208 
4 .114* .024 .024 .011 .218 
5 .181* .029 .002 .058 .303 
6 .271* .029 .000 .148 .394 
7 .223* .036 .002 .073 .374 
8 .228* .023 .000 .131 .325 
9 .034* .020 .000 .220 .388 
2 1 -.065 .021 .375 -.154 .024 
3 .053 .020 .785 -.031 .138 
4 .049 .022 1.000 -.044 .142 
5 .116* .022 .009 .023 .208 
6 .026* .027 .000 .093 .319 
7 .158* .031 .013 .026 .290 
8 .163* .015 .000 .098 .228 
9 .239* .020 .000 .156 .322 
3 1 -.118* .021 .006 -.208 -.028 
2 -.053 .020 .785 -.138 .031 
4 -.004 .022 1.000 -.097 .088 
5 .063 .018 .175 -.013 .138 
6 .153* .025 .003 .045 .260 
7 .105 .033 .329 -.036 .246 
8 .110* .019 .004 .030 .190 
9 .186* .020 .000 .100 .272 
4 1 -.114* .024 .024 -.218 -.011 
2 -.049 .022 1.000 -.142 .044 
3 .004 .022 1.000 -.088 .097 
5 .067 .023 .542 -.032 .165 
6 .157* .024 .002 .054 .259 
7 .109 .031 .116 -.021 .240 
8 .114* .013 .000 .058 .170 
9 .190* .020 .000 .105 .275 
5 1 -.181* .029 .002 -.303 -.058 
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2 -.116* .022 .009 -.208 -.023 
3 -.063 .018 .175 -.138 .013 
4 -.067 .023 .542 -.165 .032 
6 .090* .020 .031 .006 .174 
7 .042 .029 1.000 -.081 .166 
8 .047 .018 .841 -.029 .124 
9 .123* .025 .015 .018 .229 
6 1 -.271* .029 .000 -.394 -.148 
2 -.206* .027 .000 -.319 -.093 
3 -.153* .025 .003 -.260 -.045 
4 -.157* .024 .002 -.259 -.054 
5 -.090* .020 .031 -.174 -.006 
7 -.048 .022 1.000 -.141 .046 
8 -.043 .022 1.000 -.135 .050 
9 .033 .033 1.000 -.108 .175 
7 1 -.223* .036 .002 -.374 -.073 
2 -.158* .031 .013 -.290 -.026 
3 -.105 .033 .329 -.246 .036 
4 -.109 .031 .166 -.240 .021 
5 -.042 .029 1.000 -.166 .081 
6 .048 .022 1.000 -.046 .141 
8 .005 .027 1.000 -.108 .118 
9 .081 .033 1.000 -.060 .222 
8 1 -.228* .023 .000 -.325 -.131 
2 -.163* .015 .000 -.228 -.098 
3 -.110* .019 .004 -.190 -.030 
4 -.114* .013 .000 -.170 -.058 
5 -.047 .018 .841 -.124 .029 
6 .043 .022 1.000 -.050 .135 
7 -.005 .027 1.000 -.118 .108 
9 .076* .017 .032 .005 .147 
9 1 -.304* .020 .000 -.388 -.220 
2 -.239* .020 .000 -.322 -.156 
3 -.186* .020 .000 -.272 -.100 
4 -.190* .020 .000 -.275 -.105 
5 -.123* .025 .015 -.229 -.018 
6 -.033 .033 1.000 -.175 .108 
7 -.081 .033 1.000 -.222 .060 
8 -.076* .017 .032 -.147 -.005 
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Table 5. Repeated Measures ANOVA for Intensity of Competition Game 3: Average Earnings 
Per Treatment. 
Pairwise Comparisons 
Treatment  Mean Difference Std. Error Sig.a 95% Confidence Interval for Differencea 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 2 -.376 .451 1.000 -2.139 1.387 
3 -.864 .378 1.000 -2.343 .615 
4 -.593 .321 1.000 -1.850 .664 
5 -1.009 .300 .154 -2.183 .165 
6 -.734 .314 1.000 -1.964 .495 
7 -.679 .317 1.000 -1.920 .561 
8 -.752 .251 .325 -1.733 .230 
9 -.944 .287 .180 -2.068 .180 
2 1 .376 .451 1.000 -1.387 2.139 
3 -.488 .346 1.000 -1.841 .866 
4 -.217 .352 1.000 -1.592 1.159 
5 -.633 .341 1.000 -1.966 .700 
6 -.358 .289 1.000 -1.488 .772 
7 -.303 .368 1.000 -1.742 1.136 
8 -.376 .329 1.000 -1.662 .911 
9 -.568 .363 1.000 -1.987 .851 
3 1 .864 .378 1.000 -.615 2.343 
2 .488 .346 1.000 -.866 1.841 
4 .271 .312 1.000 -.948 1.489 
5 -.146 .285 1.000 -1.259 .968 
6 .129 .214 1.000 -.708 .966 
7 .184 .256 1.000 -.818 1.187 
8 .112 .283 1.000 -.993 1.217 
9 -.081 .285 1.000 -1.195 1.034 
4 1 .593 .321 1.000 -.664 1.850 
2 .217 .352 1.000 -1.159 1.592 
3 -.271 .312 1.000 -1.489 .948 
5 -.416 .207 1.000 -1.228 .395 
6 -.141 .256 1.000 -1.141 .858 
7 -.086 .216 1.000 -.932 .760 
8 -.159 .277 1.000 -1.244 .926 
9 -.351 .234 1.000 -1.267 .565 
5 1 1.009 .300 .154 -.165 2.183 
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2 .633 .341 1.000 -.700 1.966 
3 .146 .285 1.000 -.968 1.259 
4 .416 .207 1.000 -.395 1.228 
6 .275 .200 1.000 -.506 1.056 
7 .330 .160 1.000 -.298 .958 
8 .258 .186 1.000 -.471 .986 
9 .065 .190 1.000 -.677 .807 
6 1 .734 .314 1.000 -.495 1.964 
2 .358 .289 1.000 -.772 1.488 
3 -.129 .214 1.000 -.966 .708 
4 .141 .256 1.000 -.858 1.141 
5 -.275 .200 1.000 -1.056 .506 
7 .055 .205 1.000 -.747 .857 
8 -.018 .205 1.000 -.819 .784 
9 -.210 .214 1.000 -1.047 .627 
7 1 .679 .317 1.000 -.561 1.920 
2 .303 .368 1.000 -1.136 1.742 
3 -.184 .256 1.000 -1.187 .818 
4 .086 .216 1.000 -.760 .932 
5 -.330 .160 1.000 -.958 .298 
6 -.055 .205 1.000 -.857 .747 
8 -.073 .178 1.000 -.769 .624 
9 -.265 .148 1.000 -.844 .314 
8 1 .752 .251 .325 -.230 1.733 
2 .376 .329 1.000 -.911 1.662 
3 -.112 .283 1.000 -1.217 .993 
4 .159 .277 1.000 -.926 1.244 
5 -.258 .186 1.000 -.986 .471 
6 .018 .205 1.000 -.784 .819 
7 .073 .178 1.000 -.624 .769 
9 -.192 .227 1.000 -1.080 .695 
9 1 .944 .287 .180 -.180 2.068 
2 .568 .363 1.000 -.851 1.987 
3 .081 .285 1.000 -1.034 1.195 
4 .351 .234 1.000 -.565 1.267 
5 -.065 .190 1.000 -.807 .677 
6 .210 .214 1.000 -.627 1.047 
7 .265 .148 1.000 -.314 .844 
8 .192 .227 1.000 -.695 1.080 
61 
 
Table 6. Repeated Measures ANOVA for Intensity of Competition Game 3: Average Claims Per 
Treatment. 
Pairwise Comparisons 
Treatment  Mean Difference Std. Error Sig.a 95% Confidence Interval for Differencea 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 2 -.042 .059 1.000 -.291 .206 
3 -.101 .060 1.000 -.356 .154 
4 -.089 .049 1.000 -.298 .120 
5 -.125 .050 1.000 -.337 .087 
6 -.077 .048 1.000 -.279 .125 
7 -.083 .046 1.000 -.276 .111 
8 -.053 .047 1.000 -.253 .147 
9 -.122 .031 .088 -.255 .010 
2 1 .042 .059 1.000 -.206 .291 
3 -.058 .040 1.000 -.226 .109 
4 -.047 .057 1.000 -.290 .196 
5 -.083 .051 1.000 -.298 .133 
6 -.034 .044 1.000 -.220 .152 
7 -.040 .054 1.000 -.269 .189 
8 -.011 .039 1.000 -.176 .154 
9 -.080 .060 1.000 -.335 .175 
3 1 .101 .060 1.000 -.154 .356 
2 .058 .040 1.000 -.109 .226 
4 .012 .059 1.000 -.238 .261 
5 -.024 .048 1.000 -.229 .181 
6 .024 .034 1.000 -.121 .170 
7 .018 .044 1.000 -.167 .204 
8 .047 .041 1.000 -.125 .220 
9 -.022 .055 1.000 -.253 .210 
4 1 .089 .049 1.000 -.120 .298 
2 .047 .057 1.000 -.196 .290 
3 -.012 .059 1.000 -.261 .238 
5 -.036 .032 1.000 -.173 .102 
6 .012 .043 1.000 -.169 .194 
7 .007 .040 1.000 -.164 .177 
8 .036 .043 1.000 -.148 .220 
9 -.033 .046 1.000 -.226 .160 
5 1 .125 .050 1.000 -.087 .337 
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2 .083 .051 1.000 -.133 .298 
3 .024 .048 1.000 -.181 .229 
4 .036 .032 1.000 -.102 .173 
6 .048 .021 1.000 -.040 .137 
7 .042 .021 1.000 -.045 .130 
8 .072 .027 .774 -.042 .185 
9 .003 .030 1.000 -.125 .130 
6 1 .077 .048 1.000 -.125 .279 
2 .034 .044 1.000 -.152 .220 
3 -.024 .034 1.000 -.170 .121 
4 -.012 .043 1.000 -.194 .169 
5 -.048 .021 1.000 -.137 .040 
7 -.006 .019 1.000 -.087 .076 
8 .023 .028 1.000 -.096 .142 
9 -.046 .032 1.000 -.182 .090 
7 1 .083 .046 1.000 -.111 .276 
2 .040 .054 1.000 -.189 .269 
3 -.018 .044 1.000 -.204 .167 
4 -.007 .040 1.000 -.177 .164 
5 -.042 .021 1.000 -.130 .045 
6 .006 .019 1.000 -.076 .087 
8 .029 .029 1.000 -.092 .150 
9 -.040 .029 1.000 -.163 .083 
8 1 .053 .047 1.000 -.147 .253 
2 .011 .039 1.000 -.154 .176 
3 -.047 .041 1.000 -.220 .125 
4 -.036 .043 1.000 -.220 .148 
5 -.072 .027 .774 -.185 .042 
6 -.023 .028 1.000 -.142 .096 
7 -.029 .029 1.000 -.150 .092 
9 -.069 .039 1.000 -.235 .097 
9 1 .122 .031 .088 -.010 .255 
2 .080 .060 1.000 -.175 .335 
3 .022 .055 1.000 -.210 .253 
4 .033 .046 1.000 -.160 .226 
5 -.003 .030 1.000 -.130 .125 
6 .046 .032 1.000 -.090 .182 
7 .040 .029 1.000 -.083 .163 
8 .069 .039 1.000 -.097 .235 
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Appendix B 
Table 7. Paired Differences T-Tests for Duration: Average Earnings of 28 Participants. 
 Mean N Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Game 1 1.7032 19 .13548 .03108 
Game 2 1.9284 19 .02192 .00503 
 
 Paired Differences 
t Df Sig.  Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Mean 
Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Upper 
Game 1 – Game 2 -.22526 .13640 .03129 -.29100 -.15952 -7.199 18 .000 
 
 
Table 8. Paired Differences T-Tests for Duration: Average Claims of 28 Initial Participants. 
 Mean N Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Game 1 1.7700 19 .14036 .03220 
Game 2 1.9421 19 .01718 .00394 
 
 Paired Differences 
t Df Sig.  Mean Std. Deviation 
Std. Mean 
Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Upper 
Game 1 – Game 2 -.17211 .14339 .03290 -.24122 -.10299 -5.232 18 .000 
 
 
Table 9. Paired Differences T-Tests for Duration: Average Earnings of Final 24 Participants. 
 Mean N Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Game 1 1.8853 19 .04812 .01104 
Game 2 1.9174 19 .03016 .00692 
 
 Paired Differences 
t Df Sig.  Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Mean 
Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Upper 
Game 1 – Game 2 -.03211 .05192 .01191 -.05713 -.00708 -2.696 18 .015 
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Table 10. Paired Differences T-Tests for Duration: Average Claims of Final 24 Participants. 
 Mean N Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Game 1 1.9189 19 .03928 .00901 
Game 2 1.9305 19 .02094 .00480 
 
 Paired Differences 
t Df Sig. Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Mean 
Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Upper 
Game 1 – Game 2 -.01158 .04233 .00971 -.03198 .00882 -1.192 18 .249 
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Appendix C 
Table 11. Repeated Measures ANOVA for Group Size: Total Earnings Per Game. 
Pairwise Comparisons 
Treatment  Mean Difference  Std. Error Sig.a 95% Confidence Interval for Differenceb 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 2 13.799* .703 .000 11.869 15.728 
3 22.155* 1.479 .000 18.093 26.217 
2 1 -13.799* .703 .000 -15.728 -11.869 
3 8.356* 1.060 .000 5.445 11.267 
3 1 -22.155* 1.479 .000 -26.217 -18.093 
2 -8.356* 1.060 .000 -11.267 -5.445 
 
 
Table 12. Repeated Measures ANOVA for Group Size: Total Claims Per Game. 
Pairwise Comparisons 
Treatment  Mean Difference  Std. Error Sig.a 95% Confidence Interval for Differenceb 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 2 11.966* .485 .000 10.6333 13.299 
3 17.830* 1.331 .000 14.176 21.484 
2 1 -11.966* .485 .000 -13.299 -10.633 
3 5.864* 1.188 .001 2.602 9.127 
3 1 -17.830 1.331 .000 -21.484 -14.176 
2 -5.864 1.188 .001 -9.127 -2.602 
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Appendix D 
Figure 2. Intensity of Competition Game 3: Average Earnings Per Treatment. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Intensity of Competition Game 3: Average Claims Per Treatment.  
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Figure 4. Group Size: Total Earnings Per Game. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Group Size: Total Claims Per Game. 
 
 
